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Recent empirical studies using either industry-level or plant-level data from
several OECD countries have found significant complementarities between new
technological capital and white-collar labor see Berman et al., 1994; Machin,
.1994; Dunne et al., 1995; Machin et al., 1996, among others . This result supports
the hypothesis, stated as skilled-biased technological change, that the main factor
explaining the shift in relative demands for different labor inputs has been the
reduction in the price of new technological capital and its complementarity with
white-collar labor.1 However, another common result from these studies is the
small elasticities of the demand for white-collar labor with respect to capital and,
specially, technological capital. These elasticities explain only a small proportion
of the secular and cyclical variation in the proportion of white collar workers,
which remains characterized by unobservable factors. This result raises the
question of what these unobservables represent.
More recently, some studies suggest that technological change within firms
appears together with deep processes of reorganization of production see Bryn-
.jolfsson and Hitt, 1998; Bresnahan et al., 1998 . The argument is that technologi-
cal capital by itself does not yield significant benefits unless the firm performs
global changes in production organization. Such changes involve a new organiza-
tion of the workplace, which is usually complementary with high skill workers
 .see Aghion and Howitt, 1994 . In principle, this hypothesis may explain the small
elasticities between changes in occupational structure and technological capital
that have been found in previous studies. In particular, the qualitative decisions of
introducing new capital inputs may imply a deep reorganization of the production
process, which can imply a stronger effect on occupational structure than a simple
increase in the stocks of such capital inputs. Once the reorganization of the
workplace has been implemented, increasing the amount of technological capital
might have relatively small effects on the occupational structure of the firm.
In this paper, we use a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms between 1986 and
1991 with highly disaggregated information about labor and capital inputs to
evaluate the importance of alternative explanations to changes in occupational
structure and their relation with technological change. The availability of firm-level
panel data with a high disaggregation by occupation allows to obtain more robust
evidence for some empirical results in the literature. We exploit these data to
evaluate to what extent aggregation can be responsible for the empirical puzzle. In
addition, we evaluate the importance of the alternative explanation of reorganiza-
1 The empirical evidence until now has been based on the distinction between white-collar and
blue-collar labor, which are also typically labeled as skilled and unskilled labor This is the reason why
such evidence is interpreted as skilled-biased technological change
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tion of the production process.2 We postulate that the decision to introduce, by
first time, a new capital input into the production process may have different
implications on occupational structure than the decision to rise the stock of that
input once it has been installed.
Our dataset contains firm-level annual information on the number of permanent
workers by five occupations managers, professionals, commercials, clerical work-
.ers, and blue collar workers , the number of temporary workers, physical capital,
investment on R&D and purchases of technological capital externally generated to
the firm. While other datasets just report aggregate data on white collar employ-
ees, our dataset breaks down white collars into four occupations. This allows us to
distinguish the demand patterns for these occupations. Our empirical analysis is
based on the estimation of equations for the occupational shares in permanent
employment that include physical and technological capital as explanatory vari-
ables, as well as indicators on the innovative status of the firm.
The estimation results discussed in section 4 can be summarized as follows.
The estimated demand elasticities for labor inputs with respect to physical and
technological capital inputs are positive for white-collar inputs. However, the
elasticities with respect to R&D and technological capital are very small and
insignificant, with the same order of magnitude as the ones obtained by Dunne et
 .al. 1995 for the US. By contrast, the adoption of new technological capital has a
very strong effect on occupational structure: in particular, whereas the effect of
introducing technological capital is strongly positive for commercials, we find the
opposite effect for blue collars. In addition, we find a large persistence in the
demands for labor inputs. Our results yield evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that, at the firm level, changes in occupational structure have been mainly
implemented in accordance with qualitative changes in the organization of produc-
tion. This finding supports the hypothesis of reorganization of production as the
leading explanatory factor for the observed changes in occupational structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief
review of the previous empirical literature, in order to characterize the empirical
puzzle, and consider the alternative explanations to this puzzle, ending with
informal evidence about the features behind the restructuring processes in Spanish
manufacturing.
Section 3 presents preliminary evidence about the joint reorganization of the
workforce and the production process. We show that those firms that adopted new
 .technological capital between 1986 and 1991 16.5% of the firms in the sample
2  .  .Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1998 and Bresnahan et al 1998 use qualitative information about firms’
adoption of new working methods This information is very rarely available in most firms’ datasets
However, it has other type of limitations In particular, it is a cross-section with less than 380 firms As
these authors acknowledge, the correlations in their study are Alargely driven by cross-sectional
differences between firms,B and Athere is very limited evidence regarding the effects of changes over
 .time in the variables of interestB Bresnahan et al , p 18
3
have been the ones with the most intense changes in occupational structure. They
are responsible for more than 50% of the net creation of professional jobs, and for
more than 30% of the net creation of commercial jobs.
Our empirical concern, that we address in section 4, is the effect of the
introduction of new capital inputs on occupational structure. We estimate condi-
tional demand equations for labor and capital inputs where the decision to adopt
new technological capital can imply a deeper restructuring process within the firm
than a simple increase in the stock of an existing input. Furthermore, we account
for dynamics and feedback effects among labor and capital inputs. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2. Basic framework and alternative hypotheses
2.1. Pre˝ious studies
In this subsection, we provide a short review to the earlier empirical evidence
on the determinants of occupational composition of employment. The typical
specification in previous empirical work that study technology–skill complemen-
tarity has been the following see Berndt et al., 1992; Berman et al., 1994;
.Machin, 1994; Dunne et al., 1995; Machin et al., 1996, among others :
ln s sb qb w qb k qb r qb y qu 1 .i t 0 w it K i t R i t Y i t i t
where s sLWCrL is the share of white-collar employment in total employment;i t i t i t
w is the logarithm of the wage rate; k and r are the logarithms of the stocks ofi t i t i t
fixed capital and technological capital; and y is the logarithm of output. Asi t
 .explained by Bond and Van Reenen 1998 , this specification can be interpreted as
a short-run cost-minimizing input demand equation, where some direct measure of
technical progress, which is assumed to be exogenous, is used. This equation can
also be interpreted as the difference between the conditional demand for white
collars and the conditional demand function for total employment. This representa-
tion may be obtained by inverting the demands for capital inputs with respect to
their prices, and substituting such capital input prices in the conditional demands
for labor inputs. The specification implicitly assumes no adjustment costs for
labor, and no discontinuities after the adoption of new technology.3
 .Table 1 summarizes the estimation of Eq. 1 for some studies. First, notice that
the elasticities with respect to physical capital or, in some studies, capital
.equipment tend to be significantly larger than the elasticities with respect to
3  .Previous studies using micro datasets e g , Dunne et al estimate this equation using the
subsample of firms who invest in R&D
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Table 1
Estimated elasticities for physical capital, R&D, and real output Dependent variable: logarithm of the share of white collars in total employment
Article Country Data Estimation method Elasticity capital Elasticity R&D Elasticity output
Estimates from pre˝ious studies
a .  .  .  .Berndt et al 1992 US two-digit industries OLS in levels 0 054 0 016 0 014 0 006 y0 054 0 016
b1976–1986 ASM
c .  .  .  .Dunne et al 1995 US Plant level data IV First differences 0 012 0 007 0 007 0 003 y0 044 0 008
1972–1988 ASM
d .  .  .  .Machin et al 1996 US two-digit industries OLS First differences 0 068 0 014 0 013 0 007 y0 029 0 007
e1973–1989 STAN
 .  .  .UK two-digit industries OLS First differences 0 029 0 013 0 018 0 007 y0 005 0 007
1973–1989 STAN
 .  .  .Denmark two-digit industries OLS First differences 0 016 0 013 0 041 0 013 y0 068 0 009
1973–1989 STAN
 .  .  .Sweden two-digit industries OLS First differences 0 034 0 012 0 025 0 012 y0 006 0 005
1973–1989 STAN





R&D and new technological capital. This result seems at odds with the hypothesis
of technological change biased towards white-collar labor. Second, the elasticities
with respect to real output are always negative and, in several cases, significantly
larger than the elasticities with respect to capital inputs. Finally, the elasticities
with respect to physical capital and, specially, with respect to R&D and new
technological capital are too small to account for the important increases in the
dependent variable during the sample periods used in these studies. That is
 .specially the case for Dunne et al. 1995 , which is the only study that uses data on
individual firms.4 In the last panel of the table, we have replicated the estimates
 .using our Spanish firm-level dataset that will be described below , obtaining
similar results, which are not altered when we aggregate data into two-digit
industries.
2.2. Alternati˝e explanations
Here, we consider several complementary explanations to the previous puzzle.
The first and most obvious explanation is that the estimated elasticities are
downward biased due to the existence of measurement errors in the capital
variables. However, although the existence of measurement errors is quite plausi-
ble when using micro data, its incidence should be much lower when using
industry-level data. In addition, measurement errors cannot explain why the
elasticities with respect to new technological capital are significantly smaller than
the elasticities with respect to physical capital unless we are willing to accept the
very unlikely hypothesis that the measurement error in new technological capital is
.more severe than in physical capital . Nonetheless, from a simple analysis of the
data it can be seen that the main reason behind the small elasticities is that while
firms tend to invest more in capital inputs when they face positive productivity
shocks, the largest increases in skilled labor have occurred when firms experience
 .negative shocks see Dunne et al., 1995, and section 3 below . It seems therefore
difficult to explain this fact in terms of measurement errors.
A second explanation for the puzzle is that most of the reduction in blue-collar
employment has to do with the increasing competition in international trade from
emerging economies, where unskilled labor is cheaper, and not with the introduc-
tion of new technological capital. This competition may have decreased the
participation in total output, and consequently in total employment, of industries
that are intensive in production labor. The main empirical implication of this
hypothesis is that the main source of changes in occupational structure should be
between industries, due to employment reallocation from those industries suffering
the effects of international trade. This evidence have been evaluated by Berman et
4 The OLS estimates in Dunne et al , 1995 present even smaller values for the elasticities with
respect capital inputs
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 .  .al. 1994 and Dunne et al., 1995 for the US, and Machin et al. 1996 for other
OECD countries, finding that international competition has, at most, a second-order
effect on occupational structure. In Section 2.3, we will confirm such evidence for
our Spanish dataset.
A third potential explanation is that skill-biased technological change is a
consequence of the combination of new technological capital and a deep reorgani-
zation of production at the individual firm level see Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998;
.Bresnahan et al., 1998 . In particular, the qualitative decisions to introduce new
capital inputs may imply a deep reorganization of the production process, and
therefore their effect on occupational structure may be stronger than the marginal
decisions to increase the stock of already existing inputs. Once the reorganization
of the workplace has been implemented, increasing the amount of technological
capital might have small effects on occupational structure. The most important
effect of technological capital on the demand for skilled labor would be captured
by qualitative variables indicating discontinuous response of demands when new
technological capital is adopted. If that is the case, estimations that do not
recognize this discontinuous shift will provide downward biased estimates of the
complementarity between labor inputs and new technological capital.
A particular case for this reorganization of production is the outsourcing of
certain routines that were formerly involved in the production process. The idea is
that, in order to reduce costs, firms could decide to externalize certain production
tasks that were previously embedded into the production process. The goods and
services generated by such production tasks are then bought to other firms that are
specialized in those tasks. However, outsourcing might not necessarily result from
the adoption of new technologies. For instance, changes in consumers’ preferences
towards more diversified high-quality products can induce firms to specialize in
the final stages of the production and distribution process.
Finally, another explanation builds on the existence of non-homotheticities in
the production function. The optimal occupation mix may depend on the level of
output. In other words, the effect of real output on the conditional factor demands
can be different for skilled and unskilled occupations. This is consistent with the
estimates presented in Table 1. If the non-homotheticity of the production function
operates only for relatively large levels of output, and if large firms have suffered
a negative trend in their market shares e.g., as the result of market deregulation
.and increasing competition , this hypothesis might explain part of the secular
changes in occupational structure.
2.3. Inno˝ation and restructuring in Spanish manufacturing
There exists important evidence of production restructuring and outsourcing in
Spanish manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s, which appears closely related to
the adoption of new technologies. In this subsection, we give three particular
examples on three manufacturing industries: paper edition, electric material and
electronic, and textile and footwear.
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The industry of paper edition has lived a strong production restructuring at
 .several levels see Redondo, 1999 . First, firms have developed quality-oriented
strategies to face increasing competition, which have been caused by two interre-
lated phenomena: the widespread access to cheaper electronic technologies for
paper edition, and a change of the customer–seller relationship, in favor of
customized instead of standardized products. Second, firms have specialized their
production process, increasing the degree of complementarity of their production
tasks in order to capture productivity improvements and increase the efficiency in
the use of the new technologies. Such specialization has led firms to externalize
some production tasks, ordering them to other firms. In particular, there is
evidence of strategic outsourcing, consisting on cooperative agreements among
firms within this industry, which specialize in different stages of the paper edition
process.
The electric material and electronic industries in Spain faced a process of
market liberalization in the 1980s. Given the large degree of specifity of many
production tasks in this sector, the only alternative for most firms especially
.small- and medium-sized firms was to specialize in specific production tasks,
particularly on just-in-time tasks, in order to reduce operating costs. The cost of
adoption of new technologies was lowered thanks to the specialization. Suarez-Villa´
 .and Rama 1998 find that firms’ specialization originated a significant transfer of
labor force within the firms from those externalized production tasks to activities
of innovation and marketing research. Most of the innovation generated by these
firms consist of process innovations, which, in turn, have increased the demand for
highly qualified labor.
Other interesting example of outsourcing and production restructuring concerns
the textile and footwear industry, which lived a deep crisis in the mid-1980s
because of the increasing competition from developing countries after the dollar
depreciation. Since then, surviving firms and entrant firms have evolved from
 .vertical integration from basic production to final distribution to the outsourcing
of many production tasks. An interesting example is the Spanish footwear
company Panama Jack, founded in 1982, which has outsourced all the manufactur-
 .ing activities except final packing see Dinero, 1996 . In turn, it has concentrated
on product innovation that includes design, product presentation, and marketing
.strategies , but also on process innovation, organizing the production stages among
the different suppliers while maintaining the control of the final product, the R&D
and market research activities, and the product distribution. The importance of
blue-collar employment has been reduced in favor of other occupations that are
more complementary with product design and market distribution, such as man-
agerial, professional, and commercial positions.
Finally, there is an important case for outsourcing within the country that has
affected all the manufacturing industries, linked to the development of the services
 .sector. Hermosilla 1997 shows that in the last two decades most manufacturing
firms have tended to hire external services to specialized companies, instead of
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producing them within the firm. In 1993, about 19% of the total costs in
manufacturing corresponded to supply of external services. In the same year, more
than 60% of manufacturing companies buy some service activity to external firms.
 .To this matter, Collado 1994 states that the those occupations that are more
related to service activities, such as clericals, tend to be reduced in manufacturing
firms as they externalize tasks linked to services.
From the available evidence, it is clear that outsourcing of production is a very
important phenomenon that takes part in the reorganization process of firms.
However, although firms tend to externalize certain tasks that may consist on
manufacturing or services activities, they still tend to maintain the control of R&D
and selling activities, due to the strategic importance of these activities.
3. Trends in the occupational structure of Spanish manufacturing employ-
ment
3.1. The data
The main dataset consists of a panel of 1080 manufacturing firms collected
 .from the database of Central de Balances del Banco de Espana CBBE , which˜
remained in the sample every year between 1986 and 1991. This dataset was
 .already used by Alonso-Borrego 1999 to estimate a labor demand model for blue
collar and aggregate white collar workers. The criteria for selection of the sample
and construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis market value of
.the capital stocks, wages, etc. are described in the Appendix A.
One of the main limitations of this dataset for the purpose of this paper is that it
does not provide disaggregated information of temporary employment by occupa-
tion. There, we only have the number of temporary employees within the firm
during the year, and the average number of weeks worked for the year, so that we
calculate temporary employment in annual terms as the number of temporary
employees times the average number of weeks worked for the year. A potential
criticism to the empirical evidence based on this sample is that the observed
changes in occupational shares in permanent employment can merely reflect a
contract switch, from permanent to temporary, and therefore the occupational
structure of total employment may have remained unchanged. In order to shed
some light on this issue, we will also make use of the information based on the
 w x.Spanish Labor Force Survey Encuesta de Poblacion Activa EPA . The EPA is a´
large micro dataset that reports information about more than 100,000 individuals
on a quarterly basis. We concentrate on the second quarters of the EPA from 1987
to 1992.5 In order compare the occupational distribution and its trend with the
5 The second quarter contains detailed information on the labor market status of the individuals, such
as occupation, contract duration, etc
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CBBE sample, we use for each year the EPA subsample of dependent employees
working in manufacturing industries.
3.2. The e˝olution of occupational structure
In Table 2, we present the occupational shares and their changes during the
period. In the upper panel, we present this information for permanent employment
in our CBBE sample of 1080 firms from 1986 to 1991, and in the lower panel, we
report the same decomposition by type of contract based on the EPA. We have
also included the proportion of temporary employment in total employment in
both CBBE and EPA datasets. We can see that although the distribution of
employment by occupation and its evolution is not independent of the type of
contract, the changes in the occupational structure of permanent employment have
not been offset by opposite changes in temporary employment.
By comparing both datasets, we can see that the occupational shares are quite
different, with permanent blue-collar employment being much more important in
the EPA sample. This reflects the fact that the CBBE sample over-represents
large- and medium-sized firms, which have a lower proportion of permanent blue
collar employees. Moreover, temporary employment is relatively less important in
Table 2
 . Shares in employment % by occupation and type of contract change during the period in
.parentheses
CBBE Permanent
 .Blue collar 66 01 y3 77
 .White collar 33 99 q3 77
 .Managers 1 97 q0 23
 .Professionals 11 34 q1 80
 .Commercials 7 33 q1 32
 .Clericals 13 34 q0 42
 .Proportion of temporary employment 5 55 q4 67
EPA Permanent Temporary
 .  .Blue collar 80 75 y3 49 88 22 y4 18
 .  .White collar 19 25 q3 49 11 78 q4 18
 .  .Managers 1 52 q1 06 0 26 q0 16
 .  .Professionals 3 86 q1 05 2 29 q1 39
 .  .Commercials 3 31 q0 50 2 97 q0 24
 .  .Clericals 10 56 q0 87 6 25 q2 39
 .Proportion of temporary employment 12 24 q18 14
Sources: CBBE sample of 1080 manufacturing firms, 1986–1991, and EPA sample of manufacturing
employees, 1987:II–1992:II
 .Reference year for the distribution of employment by occupation is end of 1986 for CBBE and
1987:II for EPA
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the CBBE sample than in the EPA sample. However, the trends in occupational
structure for permanent employment, and in the trend of temporary employment,
appear to be very similar.
The primary fact from the CBBE sample consists of the large increase in the
proportion of white-collar occupations in permanent employment. However,
whereas this increase is unimportant in the case of clerical employment, it is high
in the case of managers, and among professional and commercial workers most
particularly. This fact is also apparent in the EPA sample, although the largest
increases take place for managerial and professional workers. In any case, from
both panels in Table 2, it is clear that the proportion of blue-collar employment did
fall during the period, irrespective of the type of contract.
However, the occupational structure of temporary employment does not match
the one found for permanent employment. Here the proportion of blue collar
workers is much higher, although we still find a significant decrease. Furthermore,
the distribution of white collar employees differs very much depending on the type
of contract: we find significant differences in the relative importance of managers
and commercials in white-collar employment by type of contract. In addition, we
observe that the increase in the proportion of commercials is much lower for
temporary workers than for permanent ones.
In order to evaluate the impact of increasing international competition on
occupational structure, we present in Table 3 a decomposition of the total
aggregate change in the shares of white-collar occupations. We follow Berman et
 .al. 1994 to define three components,
N N N
j j j jD P s D s P q s D P q D s D P 2 .  t i t i , ty1 i , ty1 i t i t i t
is1 is1 is1
where D denotes the time difference operator, P j sL jrL and P j sL j rL aret t t i t i t i t
the proportions of labor input j in aggregate permanent employment and in firm i,
respectively; and s sL rL denotes the weight of firm i in total aggregatei t i t t
employment at period t.6 The first term measures the change in the input share
due to reallocation of employment between groups. The second term measures the
change in the input share due to changes in the occupational structure within
groups. Finally, the third component captures the covariance between the previous
two terms i.e., the change in the input share as a result of reference groups
changing both their occupational structure and their participation in total aggregate
.employment . As reference groups, we consider individual firms for the CBBE
dataset, and in order to allow for comparison between CBBE and EPA datasets,
we also consider two-digit industries. If international competition explains changes
in occupational structure, we should observe that the main source of changes in
6 The periods t and ty1 denote the final and initial years in the sample period, respectively
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Table 3
 .Between-groups variation in occupation shares Reference groups: firms and industries
Occupation Source of Firms Industries
change CBBE CBBE EPA permanent EPA temporary
White collar Total change 3 766 3 766 3 489 4 180
Between groups 0 819 0 160 0 273 0 801
Within groups 3 496 3 552 3 100 3 304
Covariance y0 549 0 054 0 116 0 075
Managers Total change 0 227 0 227 1 063 0 162
Between groups 0 154 0 043 0 045 0 027
Within groups 0 301 0 214 1 029 0 100
Covariance y0 227 y0 030 y0 011 0 034
Professionals Total change 1 799 1 799 1 052 1 387
Between groups 0 110 0 057 0 166 0 321
Within groups 1 810 1 648 0 873 0 989
Covariance y0 121 0 094 0 012 0 077
Commercials Total change 1 320 1 320 0 502 0 244
Between groups 0 331 0 059 y0 031 0 213
Within groups 0 941 1 259 0 563 0 328
Covariance 0 048 0 002 y0 030 y0 296
Clericals Total change 0 420 0 420 0 872 2 386
Between groups 0 224 0 000 0 093 0 240
Within groups 0 445 0 431 0 634 1 887
Covariance y0 249 y0 011 0 145 0 259
Sources: CBBE sample of 1080 manufacturing firms, 1986–1991, and EPA sample of manufacturing
employees, 1987:II–1992:II
The decomposition of the variation in the proportion of blue collar workers has been excluded for
being redundant
occupational shares should be the reallocation of employment from some groups
to other depending on their sensitivity to international competition.
We can see that the descriptive evidence for the CBBE data is analogous for the
two alternative reference groups. The use of industries as reference groups with
CBBE data just tend to highlight the relative contribution of within-groups
variation to the total change in occupational shares. The main result from this table
is that within-groups variations constitute the leading source of changes in
occupational structure, and therefore, the main changes in permanent employment
have occurred at the individual firm or at the industry level.7 This is particularly
the case for professional and commercial workers, whose growth rates mean most
of the increase in white-collar permanent employment. Although there is also a
significant contribution of employment reallocation between-firms to the increase
7  .  .This evidence is similar to that found for the US by Berman et al 1994 and Dunne et al 1995 ,
 .or for other OECD countries by Machin et al 1996
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Fig 1 Variation in the share of white collar by industry
in the proportions of managerial and clerical employment, its total contribution to
the changes in occupational structure is trivial.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that changes in occupational structure are very
different across industries, and therefore the contribution of the different industries
to the overall changes is very dissimilar. In Figs. 1 and 2, we show bar charts by
industry of within and between firms changes in the shares of white collar and its
Fig 2 Variation in occupation shares by industry
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disaggregated occupations.8 Again, with a few exceptions, we resemble the
evidence that within-firms changes constitute the main source of occupational
shifts. But the most striking fact is the sharp differences in these shifts across
industries. For instance, we observe that the electronic industry experienced the
largest change in professionals, yet this shift is accompanied by a drop in
managers and clericals. Unlike the uprising trend in commercials, basic textile and
wood industries show a large drop in the share of commercials. This heterogeneity
across industries point out the difficulties to explain changes in occupational
structure: differences across industries have to do not only with the characteristics
of technology, but also with the fact that a particular labor input e.g., a
.professional or a commercial can be very different across industries.
3.3. Capital structure and occupational shifts
We present some descriptive information from our main dataset in Table 4. In
the first two rows of the upper panel we report the rates of growth of real output
and total employment, which shows the fact that aggregate employment evolves
accordingly to the movements in real output. In the following rows of the upper
panel we also summarize the evolution of firms’ net investments in the three
capital inputs: physical capital, R&D capital, and technological capital externally
generated to the firm,9 as well as qualitative information about the adoption by
firms of new capital inputs. Whereas investment in physical capital seems
relatively unaffected by the shocks that firms face, there appears to be a positive
correlation between firms’ investments in R&D or technological capital and
firms’ productivity shocks.
However, although there exists a large number of firms that do not make use of
R&D and technological capital inputs in their production process about 90% of
.our sample in 1986 , this number has been decreasing during the sample period. In
Table 4, we observe that there has been a significant number of firms that
introduce R&D or technological capital into the production process, that we
denote as new innovative firms.10 Whereas investments in R&D and technologi-
8 We have exclude those industries with a small number of firms in the sample nos 22, 33 and
.37–39
9 These last two variables are considered separately to distinguish between innovative capital based
on search for innovations implemented by the firm and that based on successful innovations purchased
by the firm but externally generated to it
10  .Guarnizo and Guadamillas 1998 provide descriptive evidence on the features of R&D expendi-
tures in Spain The expenditures on external R&D dominates the expenditure on R&D activities within
the firm, what reflects a significant degree of technological dependence To a large extent, these
activities generate process innovations consisting on adaptive technology aimed to improve the
production process of existing products, rather than ultimate technology or new products We should
also stress the widespread use of marketing studies, concentrated on improvements in design, quality
control, and standardization of existing products
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Table 4
 .Descriptive statistics weighted averages
Weighted means by year
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Rates of growth
Real output 8 28 7 83 7 82 0 06 0 04
Employment 1 65 1 88 1 87 y0 82 y2 21
Net in˝estment rates
Physical capital 5 23 5 98 5 92 6 41 6 15
R&D capital 31 37 23 00 19 96 16 50 17 56
Technological capital 20 71 17 32 16 83 15 92 11 97
Firms adopting new capital inputs
R&D capital 28 15 21 51 46
Technological capital 15 15 11 23 7
Weighted annualized means by sign of aggregate shock and idiosyncratic shock
 .  .Expansion 1987–1989 Recession 1990–1991
C S G All C S G All
Net in˝estment rates
Physical capital 3 18 5 65 9 35 5 92 4 41 7 36 9 33 6 15
R&D capital 22 51 15 53 21 29 20 61 13 20 17 01 24 39 17 56
Technological capital 9 77 20 67 18 35 16 44 7 35 15 25 18 21 11 97
Firms adopting new capital inputs
R&D capital 14 14 36 64 47 18 32 97
Technological capital 7 13 21 41 13 9 8 30
Within groups ˝ariations in shares
White collar 0 791 0 717 0 203 0 542 1 427 0 462 0 426 0 944
Managers 0 178 0 024 y0 018 0 052 0 267 0 047 y0 275 0 078
Professionals 0 375 0 379 y0 083 0 201 0 482 0 237 0 908 0 531
Commercials y0 045 0 195 0 410 0 209 0 560 0 024 0 030 0 298
Clericals 0 283 0 119 y0 116 0 080 0 117 0 155 y0 237 0 037
No of observations 283 293 504 1080 462 299 319 1080
To define idiosyncratic shocks, firms have been classified into three groups according with their rate of
 .  .change in total employment: Contracting C , for values below y2%; Stable S , for values between
y2% and 2%; and Growing, for values above 2%
cal capital are more intense when productivity shocks are more favorable to the
firm, the number of new innovative firms reaches its maximum in 1990, precisely
when firms face strongly negative shocks. This result is consistent with the
reorganization of production during downturns, in line with Cooper and Halti-
 .  .wanger 1993 and Caballero and Hammour 1994 , among others. This evidence
suggests that the variables indicating the introduction of R&D and technological
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capital into the production process can capture part of the qualitative decisions
about reorganization of the production process. Given that the number of new
innovative firms in our dataset is non-negligible, it may be possible to identify the
effects of introducing new inputs in the production process.
In order to distinguish between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, and to
establish the link between them, we have divided the sample period in accordance
 .to the sign of aggregate shocks, establishing an expansion 1987–1989 and a
 .recession period 1990–1991 . In each of these two periods, we have classified
firms according with three discrete states of their employment growth: contracting,
stable, and growing.
We find that although the investment rate in physical capital is not sensitive to
aggregate shocks, it depends positively on the idiosyncratic shocks faced by the
firm. We also find that investment in R&D and technological capital is slightly
procyclical, and tends to be higher in growing firms. In addition, the irruption of
new innovative firms is strongly countercyclical,11 yet there is not a clear pattern
with respect to idiosyncratic shocks. We have also included the within-firms
contribution to occupational shifts, from which we see that the within-firms
change in the share of white collars is countercyclical, and the changes are larger
for firms who are facing negative idiosyncratic shocks. This evidence suggests that
firms are more prompted to reorganize their occupational structure when they face
negative shocks, either aggregate or idiosyncratic, which, following Cooper and
 .Haltiwanger 1993 , can be explained by the fact that adjustment costs associated
to reorganization of production are proportional to output, and therefore they will
be over under downturns.
However, we find important differences when we disaggregate by white-collar
occupations. In particular, we observe that the within-firm change in clericals is
procyclical, these changes being more intense for firms who face negative
idiosyncratic shocks. In contrast with this, we see that the share of managers tends
to rise more for growing firms. In the case of professionals, contracting firms
show an important increase irrespective of the aggregate shock, but the highest
increase happens for growing firms during the recession period.
In Table 5, we provide preliminary evidence about the relationship between
qualitative changes in capital structure and shifts in occupations. In order to
consider different states in the process of new technology adoption, we have
classified our sample of firms into three groups: new innovative firms, old
innovative firms, and non-innovative firms. For each group, we report the net rates
of job creation by occupation. Half the net creation of professional jobs have been
made by new innovative firms. These firms have also contributed very signifi-
11 In addition to the fact that the number of new innovative firms is higher in the recession period, the
fact that the length of the expansion period is longer than the length of the recession period, reinforces
the argument of countercyclical behavior for this decision
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Table 5
Net job creation by occupation and by firm according with their use of technological capital
a b cNon-innovative firms Old innovative firms New innovative firms
Managers
No of jobs created 128 19 123
†Jobs created per firm 0 2 0 1 0 7
Avg net job creation rate 8 3 1 8 18 7
Professionals
No of jobs created 706 528 1122
‡Jobs created per firm 0 9 3 4 6 3
Avg net job creation rate 11 4 5 9 28 3
Commercials
No of jobs created y6 1206 570
‡ ‡Jobs created per firm 0 0 7 9 3 2
Avg net job creation rate y0 1 27 8 19 5
Clericals
No of jobs created 280 y45 y206
Jobs created per firm 0 4 y0 3 y1 2
Avg net job creation rate 3 2 y0 6 y3 5
Blue collars
No of jobs created y3822 y3955 y1519
‡Jobs created per firm y5 1 y26 0 y8 5
Avg net job creation rate y7 1 y12 4 y6 3
Firms’ distribution 749 152 179
Difference with non-innovative firm
a Non-innovative firms: never invest in R&D or technological capital
bOld innovative firms: already used R&D or technological capital in 1986
c New innovative firms: introduced R&D or technological capital in 1987–1991
†Significant at the 5% level
‡Significant at the 1% level
cantly to the creation of commercial jobs. Old innovative firms are the ones who
have created more commercial jobs, but its contribution to the creation of
professional employment is much smaller than the one of new innovative firms.
Non-innovative firms have been destroying commercial jobs, and creating a
relatively small amount of professional jobs. The eradication of blue collar jobs
seems very similar for these three groups of firms; what is consistent with the
smoothness of job destruction. Finally, the evidence for clerical employment is
significantly different to the one for the other white-collar occupations. Since
clerical jobs represent more than one third of white collar jobs, this result shows
that a simple classification of occupations in white collars and blue collars can
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underestimate the relationship between changes in capital structure and skill
upgrading of the labor force.
4. The specification and estimation results
4.1. The empirical model
Our model is based on a system of factor demand equations for a competitive
firm that produces an homogeneous good according to a particular technology;
such technology is discontinuous whenever technological capital is zero. This
discontinuity stems from the restructuring requirements that the firm should
perform when it incorporates such input to the production schedule, so that the
productivity of the different inputs are affected by the adoption of technological
capital. The firm faces adjustment costs in two instances: in the intensive margin,
changes in the stocks of existing inputs are costly; in the extensive margin, the
firm faces costs of reorganization after the adoption of new inputs.
Every period, each firm determines its factor demands so as to minimize its
expected discounted stream of current and future costs, conditional on the level of
output, taking as given its technology, adjustment costs, stocks of inputs at the
beginning of the period, and output and input prices. Under the assumptions that
technology and adjustment cost functions are additive time separable, and that
firms know current prices and technological shocks but faces uncertainty about
prices and technological shocks in the future, the model is a Markov decision
model where conditional factor demands12 are functions of the level of output, the
stocks of inputs at the beginning of the period, output and input prices, and current
technological shocks.
One common problem for the empirical implementation of factor demand
functions is the lack of reliable measures of some input prices, particularly in the
case of technological capital, since it is difficult to construct a deflator for R&D
or technological capital. In general, for most inputs — and most especially for
capital inputs — there are only, if anything, aggregate deflators, and therefore the
identification of price effects can be very poor. To overcome this problem, most
empirical studies have exploited the covariation among the demand for different
labor and capital inputs to identify input substitutability. This approach is based on
solving for capital prices in the capital input demands and substitute them into the
12 We denote the optimal demands resulting from the cost minimization problem as conditional factor
 .demands for a given output level , in contrast with ordinary factor demands which result from the
profit maximization problem The main difference between these functions is that price effects in
conditional demands just capture pure substitution effects, whereas price effects in ordinary demands
also capture the effect on the optimal output level
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labor input demands, obtaining a specification that excludes prices of capital
inputs.
We also apply this strategy, although we adopt a more general specification that
accounts for the existence of a discontinuity in factor demands. Letting D be thei t
indicator for the use of new technological capital by firm i at period t, and
 X .Xx s l , k , r , the vector of logarithms of the stocks of labor inputs l ,i t i t i t i t i t
physical capital k , and technological capital r , and denoting the vector of thei t i t
logarithm of prices of labor inputs as w and the logarithm of output as y , we cani t t
write the conditional demand for labor input j as
l j sb j qb j D qb j x qb j w qb jk qb jr qb j y qb je 3 .i t 0 D it l i , ty1 w it k i t r i t y i t e i t
For simplicity, and to overcome collinearity problems, we have considered that the
effect of adopting the new technology is just a constant shift different for each
.input in the demands of the different inputs. That is, price elasticities and
dynamic interactions are not affected. Furthermore, we have assumed that adjust-
ment costs are separable among labor and capital inputs.
Our specification for the unobservables for each labor input j can be written as
follows,
b je ’e j sh j qd j tqL j qu j 4 .e i t i t i  i. t i t
where for each firm i and each input j, h j represents unobservable firm-specifici
time invariant effects; d j is the parameter associated to the industry trend in the i.
demand of input j; L j is the aggregate shock in the demand of input j at period t;t
and u j is an idiosyncratic shock.i t
Controlling for endogeneity due to time-invariant firm-specific effects is partic-
ularly important. For instance, some firms may be using more professional
workers and more technological capital than average because of unobserved
firm-specific technological characteristics. If we ignore these effects, we would
obtain biased estimates for the complementarity among labor and capital inputs.
 .We remove these firm-specific effects taking first differences in Eq. 3 , what
yields the following equation for each labor input j:
D l j sb j D D qb j D x qb j Dw qb j Dk qb j D r qb j D yit D i t X i , ty1 w it K i t R i t Y i t
qd j qD L j qDu j 5 . i. t i t
where both d j and D L are treated as parameters to estimate. The parameters d j i. t  i.
represent industry-specific trends characterizing shifts in input demands, for which
we control by including industry dummies. The parameters in D L representt
aggregate shocks common to all firms, which can be captured by introducing time
dummies.
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If the idiosyncratic shocks u j are uncorrelated over time, then Du j will bei t i t
uncorrelated with x , D , y and previous lags of these variables. Ini, ty2 i, ty2 i, ty2j  .general, if u follows an MA q process, x , D , y andi t i, ty2yq i, ty2yq i, ty2yq
previous lags will be valid instruments. Therefore, the key issue for identification
of the model is the degree of autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic shocks u j andi t
the autocorrelation in labor and capital inputs. If adjustment costs are important
 .so that the stocks of inputs will by highly autocorrelated over time and
idiosyncratic shocks are not too persistent, identification is possible. We estimate
 .the equations in 5 using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
 .1991 . In order to test the validity of the sets of instruments we use the
Hansen–Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and a test of second-order
serial correlation in Du j .i t
We observe in our sample a significant group of firms that do not employ
professional or commercial workers at some period. However, an important
proportion of these firms have introduced these inputs during the sample period.
 .For these firms, we can estimate Eq. 5 using only the subsample of observations
where the input has been employed at two consecutive periods. In principle, this
might introduce a sample selection bias in our estimates for these labor inputs.
However, once a firm has decided to employ these labor inputs, there is a very
strong persistence in their utilization e.g., the transition probability for the dummy
.that represents the use of commercial or professional workers is 0.96 . This
indicates that this selection problem is not very important in our sample. In other
words, it seems that the decision of adopting a new labor input is not the result of
a transitory shock, but that it is associated with a shift in the fixed-effect, which
disappears when we take first differences.
4.2. Estimation results
We present the estimates for the equations of labor and capital inputs. Given
that our data distinguish between R&D capital based on firm’s expenditures for
. search innovations , and technological capital based on successful innovations
.externally generated and purchased by the firm , we consider them as different
capital inputs. Furthermore, we also consider two indicators of technology adop-
tion associated with a positive stock of each of these capital inputs. Given that the
reorganization associated with the adoption of technological capital may take some
time for the firm, we consider indicators of technology adoption at the former
period. Given the lack of firm-level information on wages for each labor input, we
include an industry-level measure of the relative wage of white collars with
respect to blue collars. In the instrument set we have included all the strictly
 .exogenous variables industry-specific variables as well as the lagged values of
all the predetermined variables from ty2 to ty4.
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Before presenting our preferred estimates of the system of equations character-
 .ized by 5 , in Table 6 we show the estimates of the labor inputs equations based
on the usual static specification without indicators for new technology adoption.
Our results are not directly comparable with previous studies since white collars
are disaggregated into occupations, and our dependent variables are the logarithms
.of labor inputs instead of the logarithms of its shares . To interpret our estimates in
the same manner as earlier studies, we should look at the relative effects of
variables among different occupations. With the exception of clericals, we can see
that the estimated elasticities with respect to physical capital relative to blue
.  .collar have a sign contrary to expected in the case of managers and commercials ,
 .or are fairly small in the case of professionals . Moreover, the elasticities with
respect to R&D and technological capital are not significant, except for managers.
In any case, the specification tests, particularly the Arellano–Bond test of second-
order autocorrelation, provide evidence against these restricted equations for most
of the white-collar inputs, suggesting that the implicit assumption of zero adjust-
ment costs in labor inputs is not appropriate.
Table 6
Estimated elasticities with respect to real output, wages, and capital inputs based on static specification
Managers Professionals Commercials Clericals Blue collars
Real output
 .  .  .  .  .0 108 0 082 y0 034 0 095 0 136 0 138 y0 082 0 101 0 103 0 117
Relative wage of white collars
 .  .  .  .  .y0 046 0 084 y0 124 0 128 y0 071 0 256 y0 067 0 128 0 087 0 129
Stocks of capital inputs
 .  .  .  .  .Physical 0 161 0 076 0 320 0 113 0 126 0 156 0 393 0 096 0 289 0 121
capital
 .  .  .  .  .R&D capital y0 027 0 024 0 010 0 027 0 027 0 031 y0 018 0 028 0 049 0 031
 .  .  .  .  .Technological 0 171 0 061 0 089 0 051 0 022 0 059 y0 019 0 049 y0 136 0 072
capital
Wald tests
 .  .  .  .  .Time 2 53 0 64 8 18 0 08 2 24 0 69 9 30 0 05 3 65 0 46
dummies
 .  .  .  .  .Industry 19 11 0 45 30 58 0 04 29 51 0 04 24 30 0 19 66 41 0 00
dummies
Hansen–Sargan test
 .  .  .  .  .29 11 0 71 42 46 0 41 42 69 0 40 43 98 0 12 44 79 0 32
 .m test second order autocorrelation2
 .  .  .  .  .y1 78 0 08 y2 10 0 04 y1 98 0 05 y1 47 0 14 y1 11 0 27
No of 4320 3687 2317 4320 4320
observations
No of 1080 962 637 1080 1080
companies
Dependent variable: logarithm of labor input GMM estimation in first differences
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Table 7
Short-run elasticities of labour inputs
Managers Professionals Commercials Clericals Blue collars
Lagged input
 .  .  .  .  .0 841 0 053 0 232 0 032 0 044 0 017 0 559 0 033 0 610 0 033
Real output
 .  .  .  .  .0 093 0 049 y0 138 0 064 y0 161 0 081 0 128 0 052 0 186 0 057
Relative wage of white collars
 .  .  .  .  .0 022 0 090 y0 209 0 127 y0 452 0 221 y0 084 0 113 y0 015 0 111
Stocks of capital inputs
 .  .  .  .  .Physical 0 040 0 052 0 296 0 088 0 102 0 109 0 049 0 063 0 118 0 074
capital
 .  .  .  .  .R&D capital y0 025 0 015 0 002 0 019 0 031 0 021 y0 008 0 017 0 065 0 017
 .  .  .  .  .Technological 0 059 0 036 0 017 0 034 y0 005 0 034 0 032 0 032 y0 015 0 032
capital
Introduction of new inputs
 .  .  .  .  .R&D capital 0 065 0 063 0 008 0 074 y0 002 0 073 0 005 0 074 y0 001 0 063
 .  .  .  .  .Technological y0 005 0 115 0 031 0 127 0 171 0 116 y0 095 0 104 y0 469 0 125
capital
Wald tests
 .  .  .  .  .Time 1 22 0 87 26 18 0 00 11 71 0 02 2 51 0 64 11 71 0 02
dummies
 .  .  .  .  .Industry 15 61 0 68 51 66 0 00 38 9 0 00 18 99 0 46 33 06 0 02
dummies
Hansen–Sargan test
 .  .  .  .  .100 43 0 66 133 53 0 10 102 73 0 77 129 42 0 15 92 84 0 93
 .m test second order autocorrelation2
 .  .  .  .  .0 03 0 98 y1 29 0 19 y1 79 0 07 y0 03 0 98 y0 63 0 53
No of 4320 3687 2317 4320 4320
observations
No of 1080 962 637 1080 1080
companies
Dependent variable: logarithm of labor input GMM estimation in first differences
In Table 7, we present the main estimation results for the labor inputs
equations, and the analogous equations for capital input demands are reported in
Table 8. The dependent variable in each equation is the logarithm of the stock of
the corresponding input. The Hansen–Sargan test cannot reject the over-identify-
ing restrictions in all the estimated equations except for physical capital.13 With
13 The evidence against model specification for physical capital can be due to the existence of more
complex dynamics not captured by the model Such dynamics could be attributed both to irreversibili-




Short-run elasticities of capital inputs
Physical R&D Technological
Real output
 .  .  .0 038 0 028 0 165 0 054 0 447 0 038
Stocks of lagged capital inputs
 .  .  .Physical capital 0 805 0 033 y0 190 0 137 y0 602 0 069
 .  .  .R&D capital 0 018 0 010 0 122 0 010 y0 110 0 017
 .  .  .Technological capital 0 009 0 012 0 051 0 033 0 188 0 006
Stocks of lagged labor inputs
 .  .  .Managers 0 058 0 029 0 423 0 091 y0 032 0 035
 .  .  .Professionals y0 007 0 014 y0 142 0 058 0 365 0 035
 .  .  .Commercials 0 014 0 011 y0 036 0 038 0 162 0 023
 .  .  .Clericals 0 006 0 014 y0 060 0 056 0 146 0 042
 .  .  .Blue collars y0 002 0 011 y0 400 0 071 0 201 0 042
 .  .  .Temporary 0 004 0 005 y0 065 0 011 0 039 0 007
Wald tests
 .  .  .Time dummies 32 17 0 00 2 60 0 63 51 18 0 00
 .  .  .Industry dummies 45 92 0 00 186 54 0 00 1884 07 0 00
Hansen–Sargan test
 .  .  .171 33 0 00 112 01 0 14 114 48 0 27
 .m test second order autocorrelation2
 .  .  .y0 28 0 78 0 10 0 92 y0 01 0 99
No of observations 4320 646 466
No of companies 1080 214 143
Dependent variable: log of capital inputs GMM estimation in first differences
the exception of commercials, the Arellano–Bond test of second-order autocorrela-
tion also presents strong evidence in favor of the specification.
The first noticeable thing in Table 7 is that the lagged endogenous variable
shows a positive and very significant effect in all the estimated equations. Since
we are controlling for individual heterogeneity, this evidence points out the
importance of adjustment costs in input demand decisions, and confirms the source
of specification error pointed out by the autocorrelation tests in Table 6. Neverthe-
less, the size of the coefficients differs very much across occupations, what points
out that inertia in the stock of labor inputs are very different.
The elasticities with respect to physical capital are positive for all permanent
labor inputs, though they are small and insignificant, except in the demand for
professionals. In fact, the difference in this elasticity between professionals and
blue collars goes from 0.031 in the static model to 0.178 in the dynamic model,
showing the serious downward bias associated with the static specification. Most
of the estimated elasticities with respect to R&D capital and technological capital
are small and very imprecise. Therefore, our results based on firm-level data
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highly disaggregated by occupations resemble the puzzle from previous empirical
work that estimated elasticities with respect to the different capital inputs are
surprisingly small. In addition, the cross effects among labor inputs, which are
presented in Appendix B, are small and insignificant in most cases.
The estimated coefficients for the indicators of adoption of R&D are small and
insignificant for all permanent labor inputs. By contrast, we find a strongly
positive effect of the adoption of technological capital on the demand for
commercials, and a significant but opposite effect for blue collar. Although the
precision of these estimates is not too high, this result highlights that the
introduction of technological capital is a much more relevant indicator of produc-
tion reorganization than the introduction of R&D capital. The reason seems to be
straightforward: whereas R&D capital is based on firms’ expenditures on search
for innovations so that reorganization of production after the introduction of
.R&D will occur only if innovations are successfully generated , technological
capital is based on firms’ purchases of successful innovations, what makes
reorganization of production more likely. It becomes apparent that the indicator of
introducing new technological capital has a larger effect than an increase in such
input once it had been introduced in the past. This result is also consistent with our
preliminary evidence in Table 5, where we obtained huge differences in the job
creation of commercial jobs for new innovative firms and non-innovative firms.
Both the magnitude and significance of the effects associated to the introduction of
new inputs are very robust to changes in the sets of instruments and explanatory
variables. Our results are in favor of the non-neutrality of some types of reorgani-
zation of production over occupational structure. In particular, the reorganization
in the production schedule after the introduction of technological capital have
exerted an important reduction in the demand for blue collars and a rise in the
demand for commercials.
The elasticities of labor inputs with respect to real output confirm the evidence
of negative correlation between shares for professional and commercial workers
and output growth found in Section 3.3, and the opposite for blue collars. A 1%
increase in real sales implies, in the short-term, a reduction of 14% and 16% for
professional and managers, and a 19% rise for blue collars. We also find positive
short run elasticities for managers, and most especially, for clericals. This last
input also showed a negative although insignificant coefficient for the adoption of
technological capital. Notice that the effect of the output level differs significantly
among labor inputs. It therefore appears that the optimal occupational composition
varies with the output level, thus suggesting the existence of non-homotheticities
in the production function.
We also find that the elasticities with respect to the relative wage of white
collars have the expected sign for three of the white-collar inputs professional,
.commercial, and clerical , but it is only significant in the case of commercials.
This lack of significance can be probably attributed to the lack of firm-level
variability for this measure.
24
In Table 8, we find interesting feedback effects of employment occupational
structure on capital investment decisions. In particular, the lagged stocks of
white-collar inputs have positive effects on the demand for technological capital,
which are significant in most cases. We also find a positive and significant effect
of managers on the demands for physical and R&D capital. Moreover, the effect
of blue collars is strongly negative and significant for R&D capital. These effects
provide evidence of feedback effects between labor inputs and capital inputs,
suggesting that the observed tendency in occupational structure a shift towards
.white-collar occupations may have anticipated growths in physical capital and
technological capital. However, although these feedback effects are significant,
they are not very large. Another interesting result is that the short run elasticities
of technological capital inputs with respect to lagged physical capital are negative
and significant, what suggests a certain degree of substitutability of the former
inputs with respect to physical capital. Finally, the positive and significant
coefficients on real output for R&D and technological capital inputs are also
consistent with the previous evidence in subsection 3.3 that investments in these
two capital inputs are positively correlated with output growth: particularly, we
find a short run elasticity of 45% for technological capital.
The fact that the lagged endogenous variables have significantly positive effects
on the demands for the different inputs stress the relevance of the dynamics in
such demands. This result implies that the demand elasticities of white-collar
 .inputs relative to blue collar implied by our estimates are, in absolute terms,
significantly higher in the long run than in the short run. However, despite that
there is evidence of feedback effects between labor and capital inputs, these effects
are small, so that accounting for them does not entail important differences in the
 .implicit long-run elasticities not reported here .
In any case, the most remarkable evidence is that the most important elasticities
for all white-collar occupations, relative to blue collar, are the ones associated with
the introduction of technological capital, both in the long- and short run. Such
elasticities are quite similar in the long- and short run, what indicates that almost
all the effect is contemporaneous. This confirms the importance of this kind of
reorganization of the production process over changes in occupational structure.
5. Conclusions
This study is concerned with the phenomenon of technological change biased
towards certain white-collar occupations occurred in most OECD countries during
the 1980s. Our data consist of a balanced panel of 1080 manufacturing firms along
the period 1986–1991 containing information on five different labor inputs,
physical capital stock and R&D and technological capital. The fact that we have
disaggregated information on white collar employees by four occupations makes
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possible to consider firm’s behavior in the demands for different white-collar
occupations. We explore alternative explanations to the results from Dunne et al.
 .1995 , among others, which found that although capital and technological capital
have significant effects on the skill composition of the workforce, they leave most
of the secular and cyclical variation unexplained.
Our main hypothesis is that the adoption by a firm of new technological capital
entails a deep reorganization of the workplace, which is usually complementary
with high skilled labor. As discussed earlier, there exist huge informal evidence
about the kind of restructuring processes lived by Spanish firms in the last two
decades. We also consider other complementary hypotheses, as the existence of
dynamic feedback effects between occupational structure and capital stocks and
non-homotheticities in the production function, which may make the optimal skill
mix to depend on the level of output. In order to provide evidence about our main
hypothesis, it is crucial to have firm-level data on discrete decisions of introducing
new inputs, in addition to the continuous decisions on changing the amounts of the
existing inputs.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the main changes
in occupational structure become more intense when firms face negative shocks.
Furthermore, whereas the intensity of investment in technological capital increases
when firms face positive shocks, the propensity of a firm to adopt new technologi-
cal capital rises as firms face negative shocks. This evidence favors the theory
about the optimality of restructuring during downturns. Second, at the firm level,
there appear significant differences between the effects on occupational structure
of the continuous decision of increasing the stock of technological capital and the
discrete decision of introducing technological capital by first time. In particular,
we observe that the introduction of new technological capital into the production
process contributes to explain sizable changes in occupational structure. In con-
trast, the introduction of R&D capital has no significant effect, which we attribute
to the fact that, contrary to technological capital, R&D capital does not measure
unambiguous introduction of successful innovations. This evidence, and the fact
that changes in occupational structure become more intense when firms face
negative productivity shocks, confirm our preliminary descriptive evidence on the
optimality of restructuring during recessions. Third, we find an important persis-
tence in the demands for most labor and capital inputs, pointing out the quasi-fixed
nature of such inputs. This implies that elasticities are much larger in the long run
than in the short run. Finally, the variables associated with occupational structure
have significant effects on capital inputs, although such effects are small and
therefore, the capital–labor feedback effects are unimportant in the long run.
The results thus provide important evidence favoring the idea that the non-
marginal decision of introducing a new input into the production process has a
different and stronger effect than increasing the amount of an input that was
already used in production. We also find that the frequency of firms undertaking
such non-marginal decisions is higher when they face negative productivity
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shocks, what is consistent with those theories that predict reorganizations of the
production process during downturns. Our results emphasize the importance of
firm-level panel data with a high disaggregation of production inputs, like the one
we use, to study the determinants of changes in occupational structure. The
availability of datasets containing more detailed and disaggregated information
about the introduction of new capital inputs and some other variables capturing the
reorganization of the production process will allow to implement a more direct test
of the reorganization hypothesis.
Appendix A. Data Description
A.1. Construction of the CBBE data set
The CBBE data set is a balanced panel of 1080 Spanish non-energy, manufac-
turing companies, with a public share lower than 50%, recorded in the database of
the Bank of Spain’s Central Balance Sheet Office. This dataset was started in 1982
collecting data on firms of large relative size and hence, oversampling larger
.firms . However, the tendency in subsequent years has been characterized by the
addition of firms of smaller relative size. The firms included in this data base
represent almost 40% of the total Value Added in Spanish manufacturing.
Although this database contains firm-level information on the balance sheets,
employment, and other complementary information for a large number of manu-
facturing companies since 1982, disaggregated data on employment are reported
only between 1986 and 1991. We have thus selected those firms that remained in
the sample during 1986–1991, and satisfied several coherency conditions. All
companies with non-positive values for net worth, capital stock, accumulated and
accounting depreciation, labor costs, employment, sales, output, or whose book
value of capital stock jumped by a factor greater than 3 from one year to the next,
were dropped from the sample.
Table A1 presents the distribution of firms in this balanced panel by size
 .measured as the time average of firm’s employees and by two-digit industries.
The total number of employees at these firms is around 180,000, that represents
approximately 8% of total Spanish manufacturing employment during this period.
We have also used a complementary dataset to obtain wages for blue collar and
white collar jobs. The CBBE dataset reports the firm’s average wage rate for total
employees, though the wage rate for each labor input is not reported. Information
on average wages for white collar and blue collar employees is reported by the
 .Encuesta de Salarios Source: Spanish National Institute of Statistics, INE . This
survey provides three-digit industry-level information about wage rates in an
annual basis, irrespective of the contract duration.
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Table A1
 .Distribution of firms by two-digit industry and by size balanced panel 1986–1991; 1080 firms
Small Med1 Med2 Large Total
 .Iron, steel and metal 22 1 4 3 2 10
 .Bldg materials 24 12 38 21 17 88
 .Chemicals 25 15 42 39 54 150
 .Non-ferrous metal 31 15 55 22 16 108
 .Basic machinery 32 13 27 22 13 75
 .Office machinery 33 0 0 0 1 1
 .Electric materials 34 3 14 15 23 55
 .Electronic 35 1 2 7 6 16
 .Motor vehicles 36 2 12 12 14 40
 .Shipbuilding 37 0 3 1 2 6
 .Other motor vehicles 38 0 1 4 3 8
 .Precision instruments 39 1 1 0 2 4
 .Non-elaborated food 41 22 39 26 25 112
 .Food, tobacco, and drinks 42 23 22 15 20 80
 .Basic textile 43 11 19 24 22 76
 .Leather 44 2 9 7 3 21
 .Garment 45 4 22 20 10 56
 .Wood and furniture 46 6 18 13 6 43
 .Cellulose and paper edition 47 8 25 18 15 66
 .Plastic materials 48 9 13 16 4 42
 .Other non-basic 49 4 8 6 5 23
Total 152 374 291 263 1080
The size variables are referred to the firm’s time average of total employment Small denotes
employment lower or equal than 25 Med1 denotes employment between 25 and 75; Med2 denotes
employment between 75 and 200; and Large for employment larger than 200
A.2. Construction of ˝ariables
A.2.1. Employment
Number of employees is disaggregated in permanent white collar, permanent
blue collar, and temporary employees. Permanent white-collar employment is also
disaggregated into four occupations: managerial, professional, commercial, and
clerical. To maintain measurement consistency, number of temporary employees is
calculated in annual terms by multiplying the number of temporary employees
along the year times the average number of weeks worked by temporary employ-
ees and divided by 52.
A.2.2. Output
Gross output at retail prices is calculated as total sales, plus the change in
finished product inventories and other income from the production process, minus
 .taxes derived on the production net of subsidies .
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A.2.3. Physical capital
 .We are interested in depreciable physical capital which is already productive ,
so Land and Capital stock in the course of construction are excluded from the
definition of physical capital. Since the CBBE does not have independent esti-
mates of investment available, gross nominal investment I must be imputed fromi t
changes in the book value of physical capital with a correction for depreciation,
that is I sKNB yKNB qDep qRev where, KNB sKGB yADepi t i t i, ty1 i t i t i t i t i t
is the book value of the net stock of physical capital book value of the gross stock
.of physical capital KGB minus accumulated depreciation ADep ; Dep is thei t i t i t
accounting depreciation during the year; and Rev is the net variation in the booki t
value of physical capital and in its accumulated depreciation due to positive
andror negative revaluations.
To calculate the replacement value of capital, we use a perpetual inventory
method which takes account for depreciation and inflation. To do this, an initial
value for the first year that data is available for a given firm is calculated as
 .  .AA iq K s q rq =KGB 1yd where q is the price deflator of the1 i1 1 1yAA i t i ti
stock of physical capital at year t; d is the average depreciation rate of the stocki
of physical capital; and AA is the average age of the stock of physical capital,i
which is approximated by the ratio ADep rDep for the first year in which datai1 i1
for the firm are available. Furthermore, the average depreciation rate is computed
at the firm level as the ratio of firm’s average accounting depreciation to the firm’s
average accumulated depreciation. As regards price indices, the corresponding
 .GDP implicit deflator of investment goods is used Source: INE . The recursive
method to compute the replacement value of the stock of physical capital from the
 .  .second year that data is available is q K s q rq =K 1yd q I ,t i t t ty1 i, ty1 i i t
which assumes that investment occurs at the end of the year.
A.2.4. R&D and technological capital stocks
The CBBE data report data on R&D investment, defined as the firm’s
expenditures on search for innovations, and investment in technological capital,
defined as the firm’s expenditures on successful innovations externally generated
to the firm. We treat these two variables as separate items. Since the stocks of
these R&D and technological capital are unknown, to construct the corresponding
 .stocks we assume, following Hall and Mairesse 1995 , a depreciation rate for
both stocks of 15% and a presample growth in real investment of 5%. Therefore,
the stocks of R&D and technological capital, for the first year in which data are
 .available, KRD and Ktec , are calculated as KRD sRD r 0.05q0.15 andi1 i1 i t i1
 .Ktec sRtec r 0.05q0.15 , where RD and Rtec are the firm’s investmentsi1 i1 i t i t
in R&D and technological capital at period t. From the subsequent years, we
compute the stocks of R&D and technological capital using a perpetual inventory
method. As the price index, we use the Retail Price Index at the two-digit industry
level.
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Appendix B. Complementary estimates
Table A2. Short-run cross dynamic effects among labor inputs.
Managers Professionals Commercials Clericals Blue collars
Managers y0.031 y0.216 0.051 0.063
 .  .  .  .0.072 0.072 0.051 0.060
Professionals 0.020 0.065 y0.025 0.007
 .0.022 0.065 y0.025 0.007
Commercials y0.010 y0.015 0.013 0.037
 .  .  .  .0.018 0.023 0.020 0.021
Clericals 0.012 0.020 y0.015 0.034
 .  .  .  .0.022 0.034 0.035 0.027
Blue collars y0.040 y0.017 0.116 0.010
 .  .  .  .0.052 0.023 0.032 0.023
Temporary y0.012 y0.009 y0.003 0.000 y0.015
 .  .  .  .  .0.009 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.011
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